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2They go in peace for all mankind, and all mankind 
is in their debt. – President George W. Bush, 
February 4, 2003
This cause of 
exploration and 
discovery is not an 
option we choose; it is 
a desire written in the 
human heart …
Outline
• The evolution of SMA in human spaceflight at 
NASA
• What we can learn from Columbia and 
Challenger
• Lessons Learned applied to current programs 
• SMA in future Human Spaceflight Programs
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4Apollo 1
Why SMA Began
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Apollo-1 (204)
A Long History of Successes Led to Overconfidence.  
A New SR&QA Office at MSC (JSC) Independent of 
Project and Reporting to the Center Director was Created.
Challenger Accident
STS 51-L 
Columbia Accident
STS 107
Problem Ignored as “Within Experience Base” and was Closed.
An Office of Safety and Mission Assurance with Created at HQ.
All Centers Created an SR&QA Organization w/Funding Directly from 
HQ.
Prior to Columbia, Programs were Funding SMA again.
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7Evolution of SMA in Space Shuttle Program
From the “JSC S&MA Space Shuttle Program Legacy 
Report, presentation by Scott Johnson, February 22, 2012
Evolution of SMA in Space Shuttle Program
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What can we learn from Challenger and Columbia?
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What can we learn from Columbia and Challenger?
• Beware of “normalization of deviance” and group think; don’t use past 
success to ensure future success
• Provide organization and culture where dissenting opinions can be heard
• Listen to the hardware, and be wary of how data can be misused or 
misrepresented
• You’re not as smart as you think you are; it can happen to you
• Keep safety programs independent from the programs they evaluate
• Employ a rigorous systems engineering process
• Sources:  myself, Terry Wilcutt, Wayne Hale
• The evolution of SMA in human spaceflight at 
NASA
• What we can learn from Columbia and 
Challenger
• Lessons Learned applied to current programs 
• Safety and Mission Assurance in future Human 
Spaceflight Programs
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Engineering and SMA 
Technical Authority
Programmatic Authorities Accept the Risk with
Concurrence of the Technical Authorities
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"NASA's constant attention to 
safety is the cornerstone upon 
which we build mission 
success. 
We are committed, 
individually and as a team, 
to protecting the safety 
and health of the public, 
our team members, 
and those assets that 
the Nation entrusts to the 
Agency.” NPD 1000.0.
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Dissenting Opinion at the 
SMA Council (SMAC)
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• Safety and Mission Assurance in future Human 
Spaceflight Programs
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Applicability for Future Programs
• Culture
– Cooperation and coordination within and between organizations is needed to increase 
organizational effectiveness
– Benefits:
• Better coordination and sharing of technical data results in improved timeliness and quality of SMA 
Risk Assessments
• Earlier coordination and resolution of technical issues results in better SMA support
– Safety must be more than a role compliance organization (role compliance to requirements with 
regard to sound engineering risk trades)
– Benefit: Improved working relationship with other organizations and added real value to 
program mission support
• Process
– Safety must be involved early to be effective and must be committed to “near real-time” support 
for flight operations
• Products
– Improve risk assessment capability through use of quantitative and qualitative risk assessment 
tools
– Benefit:  Help frame risk discussions and characterize safety risks for program and agency 
management
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From the “JSC S&MA Space Shuttle Program Legacy Report, 
presentation by Scott Johnson, February 22, 2012
Applicability for Future Programs
• Periodically assess the health of the SMA organizations as they relate to human 
spaceflight by periodically taking into consideration:
– Budget trends
– Staffing
– Personnel turnover (loss of critical skills)
– Anomaly trends/close calls
– Use of dissenting opinion process
– Review of SMA products
– Development of relevant and effective tools for risk qualification and quantification
– Open and multiple lines of communication
– Integrity of Independent Technical Authority for engineering and for SMA
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Conclusions
• SMA has evolved over time through accidents, funding 
shortfalls, and reorganizations to become a mission success 
organization that is an integral part of programs and projects 
• By involving SMA “early and often” in programs and projects, 
relevant value added inputs can be made to ensure mission 
success
• A SMA organization can be effective by providing more 
advanced tools, such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment, and 
qualitative and quantitative risk assessments that provide a 
program or project manager with a way to assess, mitigate, 
and accept risk
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Conclusions (cont.)
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• The Independent Technical Authority improved the visibility, 
technical competence, and leadership positions within SMA
• The dissenting opinion process and safety culture addresses 
ways and environment for people to express their opinions
• NASA Safety Center and other collaborative efforts have 
provided repositories and information for sharing lessons 
learned
Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human 
Spaceflight
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Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human 
Spaceflight (Space Shuttle Only)
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Required by National/ 
International standards such 
as AS9100; ISO 9001, etc., 
NASA Policy/Standards.
Enliven Roles Maximize 
Performance
ACHIEVE
RESULTS
SMA
Technical
Expertise
REQUIREMENTS
DRIVEN
CONCEPT
EVALUATION
Provides a second, 
independent involvement in 
design, development, test & 
evaluation to incorporate 
checks and balances. Protect 
lives, high value assets and 
critical mission success.
TECHNICAL
AUTHORITY
A critical complementary 
second set of eyes and ears 
to other technical authorities 
providing healthy checks 
and balances.
SAFETY & QUALITY
Build in safety and quality; 
rather than inspect it in.
COMPETENCE
Market competence by 
producing consistently high quality 
products without latent defects; 
requiring low repair, re-work, scrap 
costs-high value product.
RESULTS DRIVEN
Provide net results, as well 
as safe, reliable products 
which save lives, property 
and money.
SMA Is An Integral Part Of Mission 
Success
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